Great conversation, though I'd be curious to hear a continuation of it breaking through the dichotomy of reductionism/emergentism to holism, and one that perhaps explores more of cosmopsychism/panexperientialism. I have some trouble seeing how a "truly" metamodern philosophy can be other than holistic and panexperiential (Perhaps even panENexperiential. For my own attempt at this, see https://tmfow.substack.com/p/on-the-horizon). This seems to me to resonate quite well with what is brought up in this conversation about contrasting reality and our abstractions of it.
On additional thought: thinking of «causal closure» as inclusive of non-efficient causality is problematic both conceptually and linguistically. Do you really want to redefine «causal closure» to include these? I find it hard to see how this could do anything but cause confusion without having to qualify this redefinition at every usage.
Great conversation, though I'd be curious to hear a continuation of it breaking through the dichotomy of reductionism/emergentism to holism, and one that perhaps explores more of cosmopsychism/panexperientialism. I have some trouble seeing how a "truly" metamodern philosophy can be other than holistic and panexperiential (Perhaps even panENexperiential. For my own attempt at this, see https://tmfow.substack.com/p/on-the-horizon). This seems to me to resonate quite well with what is brought up in this conversation about contrasting reality and our abstractions of it.
On additional thought: thinking of «causal closure» as inclusive of non-efficient causality is problematic both conceptually and linguistically. Do you really want to redefine «causal closure» to include these? I find it hard to see how this could do anything but cause confusion without having to qualify this redefinition at every usage.