The Nature of Consciousness and What To Do About It

A dialogue with Jack Bagby about Whitehead's and Bergson's approaches to consciousness

In this dialogue, Jack and I explore the nature of consciousness. I suggested at the get go that conscious thought is a process of “becoming other,” an ongoing participatory transformation with reality rather than a separate substance or quality somehow realized inside the head.

I opened with a couple of lighthearted but probing questions to the audience (in this case, students and faculty in our graduate program): “Who here is conscious?” “How do you know?” I then introduced philosopher David Bentley Hart’s idea that consciousness is inherently self-reflexive. Hart suggests that within each “me” (the self that experiences the world), there’s also an “I” that observes this “me,” introducing a layered awareness that philosophers like Kant have long pondered. Hart’s distinction between the empirical self, which actively engages the material world, and the transcendental self, which observes beyond the immediate, emphasizes that consciousness is complex—more than just a product of the brain, it’s an awareness that stretches across multiple modes of existence.

Jack suggested that we often overstate the importance of consciousness, particularly when it is narrowly defined as focused awareness. He argued that this limited view of consciousness could actually act as a distraction, narrowing our attention and preventing us from fully engaging with the broader field of psychic experience. Jack pointed out that some of our most profound experiences—such as states of deep pleasure or immersion in memory—occur outside this narrow frame of conscious awareness. In this sense, consciousness, as conventionally understood, may even obstruct the fullness of experience. He aligned his perspective with that of Plotinus, who saw consciousness as fragmentary and believed it could hinder a more comprehensive engagement with life.

In response, I expanded on Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme, which redefines consciousness not as an unchanging subject or the sole possessor of thoughts but as a fleeting form of feeling that emerges under specific conditions. Whitehead introduces the concept of “prehensions”—non-cognitive feelings arising from past experiences that form the groundwork of subjective experience. According to Whitehead, experience doesn't begin with consciousness; it begins with these prehensions that carry the past into the present moment. Consciousness emerges only when this process involves a comparison between “what is” and “what could be,” allowing for freedom and choice. Thus, consciousness is a rare phenomenon—a late-stage awareness that builds upon the deeper process of “concrescence,” which is the gathering of feelings into a coherent moment.

Jack then elaborated on Bergson’s model, offering an alternative understanding of consciousness. In Bergson’s view, consciousness is a tension between the present and memory. Jack illustrated this with Bergson’s cone diagram: the point of the cone represents the immediate present, while the broader top symbolizes the vast reach of memory. In this model, consciousness fluctuates between habit-driven actions and a relaxed, imaginative flow. For Bergson, consciousness bridges the practical demands of the present with the accumulated potential of the past, making it a dynamic and evolving interaction

Together, we explored how both Whitehead and Bergson perceive consciousness as deeply rooted in the flow of experience, even if they conceptualize its structure differently. Bergson emphasizes continuity—a flow of time he calls “duration”—suggesting that consciousness is an unbroken, organic unfolding. Whitehead, on the other hand, proposes that experience occurs in discrete pulses, with consciousness emerging selectively within those moments. Despite these differences, both views see consciousness as active and evolving rather than passive and static.

I then critiqued the predictive processing model prevalent in neuroscience and cognitive science, at least to the extent that it positions itself as a theory of consciousness. Predictive processing posits that the brain is primarily concerned with minimizing prediction error. Consciousness is described as a controlled hallucination generated by the brain. The brain is said to be engaged in conjuring expectations about the world and adjusting them based on sensory input to minimize surprise. This model suggests that evolution has shaped consciousness as a survival mechanism focused on reducing error and maintaining stability, implying that life is fundamentally about minimizing risks and avoiding threats.

To truly understand consciousness, we need to recognize life’s desire for growth and intensity. Organisms strive not just to survive but to deepen their intimacy with reality and intensify their experience. While predictive processing centers on “error minimization,” I proposed that we also need a principle of “eros maximization”—a drive to explore, connect, and amplify experience. Consciousness isn’t only concerned with the avoidance of surprises; it seeks richer, more aesthetically intense contact with the world.

Building on this, Jack reintroduced Bergson’s idea of consciousness as duration—an organic, continuous unfolding. For Bergson, consciousness arises from a broader field of experience that isn’t limited to the goal of minimizing errors. It is an evolving field that incorporates memory, movement, and the potential to engage with novel possibilities.

This led us to delve deeper into panpsychism and the possibility of a “mental pole” present even in the simplest forms of existence. I referred to Whitehead’s idea that all entities, down to the most fundamental components of the universe, possess some degree of experiential potential. This challenges the conventional view of matter as devoid of experience and suggests that at least a rudimentary form of experience may be basic to the cosmos.

Whitehead’s theory of concrescence implies conscious agents must “die to the present” in order to influence the future. In Whitehead’s framework, consciousness allows us to decide; but to actualize our decision, we must let go of our current state, perishing out of immediate subjectivity into immortal superjectivity so that subsequent occasions of experience can feel and, if it be persuasive enough, inherit the impulse.