We should make a difference between the mereotopology of regions and any mereology or mereotopology characteristic of other categories of entities. The only mereotopology Whitehead offered semiformally is one for regions, and it's this version that then influenced later mereological theories. Importantly I think for your comments here, Whitehead doesn't have a dynamic mereotopology for regions. A region has a fixed, determinate boundary: "a certain determinate boundedness is required for the notion of a region... Wherever there is ambiguity as to the contrast of boundedness between inside and outside, there is no proper region" (PR 301). Regions thus also have fixed, determinate parts, and their identity could be defined extensionally in terms of their parts (as also occurs in classical mereology). This is crucial for his philosophy of science, since his theory of extension is meant to provide the necessary geometrical structure involved in the "uniformity of nature" presupposed by physics.
There should be a reading group for Whitehead scholars interested in learning more about mereology.
We should also distinguish between regions as those function on the one hand physically, and on the other hand conceptually. The way extensive relations actually determine how occasions feel each other is what leads to what in physics is studied as the transmission of energy as describable using a geometrical system. On the other hand, occasions (and especially living occasions) also have a mentality in which they can entertain possibilities about these regions, their relations, and what may be located at them. We would thus be concerned with conceptual feelings (especially propositional and intellectual feelings). This seems more like what you are most directly interested in, rather than the mereotopology of physical relationships per se; I think it's here that you get a bit more dynamics as subjective beliefs or attitudes about regions/extensive relationships are updated.
I know you have another post that explores more about morphogenetic fields and related stuff, and I have tagged that post to read when I get time, but for now, are you talking about the same ideas that Rupert Sheldrake proposed? And if so, do you think Sheldrake's thinking was valid all the way through, or does it contain some great ideas but is incomplete and in some assertions incorrect?
Matt, how does this resonate with Stuart Kauffman's ideas about adjacent possibles in complex systems? I tried to address this in the draft paper I sent you that is now available on academia.edu and ResearchGate.
In the midst of all that, this comment from an old Sufi might be of interest in terms of a radically different take on causation:
“Not a leaf trembles but for the Will of Allah.” [and if you hear this as some kind of determinism, it’s far from that]
And then there is this from the third section of “The Imitation of Christ,” where Jesus is speaking in the first person as the Word: “Behold all things in Truth, flowing forth from my Being.”
And finally, an interesting observation about the limitations of the ordinary scientific view, from British professor turned Indian sage: “One might say there are two ways to look at cause and effect, one vertical and one horizontal; on the horizontal plane, it seems that phenomena cause other phenomena; on the vertical plane, we see Krishna’s loving hand gently guiding [ not controlling] all things.
Krishna Prem adds, from one perspective, it is as if nature - Prakriti - acts alone, and the Purushottama is simply a passive observer; from another, the Purushottoma is the actor, acted upon, and the act.
Neither is complete in itself, nor are both together the truth. Until we have the integral vision, we cannot think our way to an understanding of this. With that vision, we can hardly believe how simple and obvious this all is.
We should make a difference between the mereotopology of regions and any mereology or mereotopology characteristic of other categories of entities. The only mereotopology Whitehead offered semiformally is one for regions, and it's this version that then influenced later mereological theories. Importantly I think for your comments here, Whitehead doesn't have a dynamic mereotopology for regions. A region has a fixed, determinate boundary: "a certain determinate boundedness is required for the notion of a region... Wherever there is ambiguity as to the contrast of boundedness between inside and outside, there is no proper region" (PR 301). Regions thus also have fixed, determinate parts, and their identity could be defined extensionally in terms of their parts (as also occurs in classical mereology). This is crucial for his philosophy of science, since his theory of extension is meant to provide the necessary geometrical structure involved in the "uniformity of nature" presupposed by physics.
There should be a reading group for Whitehead scholars interested in learning more about mereology.
We should also distinguish between regions as those function on the one hand physically, and on the other hand conceptually. The way extensive relations actually determine how occasions feel each other is what leads to what in physics is studied as the transmission of energy as describable using a geometrical system. On the other hand, occasions (and especially living occasions) also have a mentality in which they can entertain possibilities about these regions, their relations, and what may be located at them. We would thus be concerned with conceptual feelings (especially propositional and intellectual feelings). This seems more like what you are most directly interested in, rather than the mereotopology of physical relationships per se; I think it's here that you get a bit more dynamics as subjective beliefs or attitudes about regions/extensive relationships are updated.
You realize, of course, that you are expressing thoughts that Whitehead wishes he had thought.
I know you have another post that explores more about morphogenetic fields and related stuff, and I have tagged that post to read when I get time, but for now, are you talking about the same ideas that Rupert Sheldrake proposed? And if so, do you think Sheldrake's thinking was valid all the way through, or does it contain some great ideas but is incomplete and in some assertions incorrect?
Thank you Matt for this review and everything you do!
This article by Bonnitta Roy seems appropriate to the question of how forms are enacted in ‘Complex potential states’:
https://medium.com/perspectives-on-complexity/complex-potential-states-ab71951331ad
If we are not just slaves to the form of our problems … ‘what can we do from here?’ Is another good beginning always.
Very hopeful indeed
Morphic resonance theory could be applied for sure
Hi Matt
Somewhere (?) I got a message that you were holding a substack live (I think on Friday)
Anyhoo, I would like to address what is your interpretation of this
https://youtu.be/fxeWAp9s7RE?si=_ISKyO4202RBPjgX
and I'd like to share my thoughts too - if I can find/remember how to join
https://youtu.be/fxeWAp9s7RE?si=_ISKyO4202RBPjgX
Another example, less dramatic
What do you see?
https://youtu.be/m-dy2L4F5uA?si=UJOao_5MN4poMpyu
Matt, how does this resonate with Stuart Kauffman's ideas about adjacent possibles in complex systems? I tried to address this in the draft paper I sent you that is now available on academia.edu and ResearchGate.
In the midst of all that, this comment from an old Sufi might be of interest in terms of a radically different take on causation:
“Not a leaf trembles but for the Will of Allah.” [and if you hear this as some kind of determinism, it’s far from that]
And then there is this from the third section of “The Imitation of Christ,” where Jesus is speaking in the first person as the Word: “Behold all things in Truth, flowing forth from my Being.”
And finally, an interesting observation about the limitations of the ordinary scientific view, from British professor turned Indian sage: “One might say there are two ways to look at cause and effect, one vertical and one horizontal; on the horizontal plane, it seems that phenomena cause other phenomena; on the vertical plane, we see Krishna’s loving hand gently guiding [ not controlling] all things.
The lure.
The eternal aspiration of the heart for the Beloved.
Krishna Prem adds, from one perspective, it is as if nature - Prakriti - acts alone, and the Purushottama is simply a passive observer; from another, the Purushottoma is the actor, acted upon, and the act.
Neither is complete in itself, nor are both together the truth. Until we have the integral vision, we cannot think our way to an understanding of this. With that vision, we can hardly believe how simple and obvious this all is.
The ‘Platonic Ideal’ underlying all of subjective reality.